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government healthcare plans by then, 15 and Teddy Roosevelt championed healthcare reform in his losing presidential campaign of 1912. When Roosevelt lost to Woodrow Wilson, the cause was taken up by the American Association for Labor Legislation, which supported healthcare coverage for industrial workers. 16 Interestingly, the national healthcare movement was supported by the American Medical Association (AMA) at that time. 17 Indeed, a committee of the AMA reasoned that physicians' "blind opposition, indignant repudiation, bitter denunciation of these laws is less than useless; it leads nowhere and it leaves the profession in a position of helplessness as the rising tide of social development sweeps over it.
By 1920, the effort to enact government-sponsored coverage had stalled, in part because more conservative elements at the AMA led to a reversal of the association's support for government-sponsored healthcare coverage. 19 Opposition also came from the insurance industry, the pharmaceutical industry, employers, and labor unions. 20 (The labor leader Samuel Gompers apparently feared that benefits gained through legislation rather than negotiation would be vulnerable to later repeal or limitation.
2 1 He probably also felt that benefits won by negotiation would make workers more likely to support unions.
)
Timing often matters to the success of legislative reform, and opponents of a right to healthcare could exploit U.S. involvement in World War I against Germany and the Russian Revolution of 1917. Critics of national health insurance were able to discredit the policy by connecting it with Germany, which was the first country to enact a national healthcare plan. 23 The link to Russia and its right to healthcare allowed opponents to argue that national health insurance was a first step toward socialism. 24 The next push for national health insurance came during the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, and the Social Security bill that was ultimately passed in 1935 originally included a provision for healthcare coverage. 25 The combination of physician opposition and the desire not to compromise the passage of Social Security, however, led FDR to drop his support for national health insurance. 26 The Truman administration initiated the third effort for national health coverage, but the United States was embroiled in the Cold War, and the AMA again waved the flag of socialism to mobilize public opposition. 27 In addition to the AMA's important influence, Truman faced a recalcitrant Congress that at the time was
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After four decades of failure to enact a universal healthcare program, advocates decided to refine their approach in the 1950s, and the strategy that ultimately led to the passage of Medicare and Medicaid was formulated. 9 Wilbur Cohen and 1.S. Falk recognized that a health insurance plan focused on Social Security beneficiaries would be much easier to sell than a plan for all Americans. 30 By limiting its benefits to the elderly, Medicare could be portrayed as a program for people who met two important criteria: 3 1 they had greater need for healthcare coverage and they were 32 especially deserving of public assistance. Because of their age, seniors have relatively high medical costs-when Medicare was passed, average healthcare expenses for people sixty-five or older were twice the average expenses for younger persons. 33 At the same time, the elderly were less able to afford healthcare bills. 34 Medicare would kick in when people no longer were working and were experiencing a greatly reduced income. 35 Moreover, their reduced income did not reflect a lack of initiative or an attempt to exploit the system. Rather, they had made their contributions to society and moved into a well-deserved retirement. 36 Cohen and Falk further restricted their proposal by limiting it to hospital costs (and only sixty days of hospitalization a year). 37 The Medicare proposal was refined further by making it a form of social insurance rather than public welfare. People qualified themselves and their spouses for Medicare in the same way that they qualified themselves and their spouses for Social Security-by making payments to the Social Security system during their working lives. 38 In other words, while a public assistance program for younger persons might stifle initiative and promote dependence, the Medicare program became available for persons who were not expected to be active workers and who in fact had earned their eligibility. 39 Medicare recipients would truly be "deserving" of their benefits. 40 Still, even with a much narrower and politically more appealing range of coverage, it was not possible to pass Medicare until President Lyndon Johnson's 29 OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 22-23. By that time, a few proposals were being floated. There was the Cohen-Falk idea of hospital coverage for the elderly, with mandatory participation for workers (just as participation in the Social Security system is required) 4 3 Republicans offered a counterproposal for a voluntary program that would subsidize the purchase of comprehensive private insurance by the elderly. 44 The Republicans, then, drew three important contrasts with the Cohen-Falk proposal.
4 a Their program would be optional rather than required, involve coverage by private companies rather than by government, and cover all medical services rather than just hospitalization. 46 The third main proposal came from the AMA and involved a federal-state program to subsidize the purchase of private health insurance for the elderly poor. 47 Like the Republicans, the AMA wanted a plan that was more reliant on the private sector. The AMA also argued for a means-tested program, on the theory that the government should not be subsidizing healthcare coverage for elderly persons who could afford to purchase their own insurance.
9
As healthcare reform worked its way through the legislative process, U.S. Representative Wilbur Mills, Chair of the Ways and Means Committee, came up with legislation that essentially combined the three proposals:
50
The Cohen-Falk bill became Part A of Medicare, a mandatory program to cover hospital costs and that would be funded by employer and employee payroll taxes. 51 The Republican proposal became Part B of Medicare, a voluntary program for physicians' services (funded by general revenues and individual premiums).
2
The AMA proposal was modified from a proposal to cover the elderly poor to a program that would cover children and some adults under the age of sixty-five who were unable to afford private health care coverage.
3 Thus was born Medicaid.
B. THE LIMITED NATURE OF FEDERAL HEALTHCARE STATUTORY RIGHTS
After more than fifty years, the United States finally came in 1965 to accept a right to healthcare, but even then it was a highly limited right. All seniors would be eligible for coverage under Medicare, and many of the poor would be eligible for 49 MARMOR, supra note 2 1, at 46-47. 51 OBERLANDER, supra note 13, at 30-31. 51 Id. 
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coverage under Medicaid. 54 But rather than recognizing a right to healthcare for all persons, Congress opted to enact a right for those who "deserved" such a right.
As indicated, Medicare beneficiaries were seen as deserving of their new program because they had earned it through a lifetime of work and financial contributions. 56 The adoption of the Medicaid program illustrated another way in which Americans could be seen as deserving of healthcare coverage. Some people, it was thought, lacked health insurance through no fault of their own. 57 One could not blame children, for example, for their failure to afford coverage. Medicaid was enacted as a program for poor persons who did not seem responsible for their lack of insurance. 58 Children, single parents with children, and persons with disabilities would qualify if their family incomes fell below an eligibility threshold.
5 9 All of these persons were seen as not responsible for their predicament, either because of 60 age or infirmity or because of their childcare obligations.
Thus, while the public commonly thinks of the Medicaid program as providing universal coverage for the poor, it never was designed to insure all of the indigent. The Medicaid program requires coverage only for poor people who fall into one of the mandatory coverage categories ("categorical eligibility").
6
' The mandatory groups include pregnant women, children, parents with dependent children, and persons with serious disabilities. 62 Medicaid categories are defined not only by family status or disability, but also by income. 63 Thus, for example, children usually are covered when family incomes are no more than 200% of the federal poverty level, while parents may not be eligible even when family income is below fifty percent of the federal poverty level. 64 Initially, Medicaid eligibility was tied to eligibility for one of the federal welfare programs (e.g., the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children, now Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF)). 65 Thus, Medicaid originally did not cover families where a father was in the home and working, and other than in a few states operating under Medicaid waivers, it still does not cover any able-bodied adults who do not have children. 66 Medicaid falls short of covering all of the poor for another reason; it has not covered many of those who are eligible for it. While virtually all seniors sign up for Medicare, many individuals who qualify for Medicaid fail to enroll. 69 As with other public benefit programs that are "means-tested," Medicaid must screen applicants to make sure they qualify, and that can discourage people from filing for benefits.
70
Qualified persons may be unaware of their eligibility or find it difficult to navigate the application process. 71 The screening process can be daunting, especially for poorly educated persons. ACA will simplify the application process, but some persons eligible for public programs wish to avoid the embarrassment of being a recipient. 72 Having to rely on governmental benefits can be demeaning, and some individuals prefer to maintain their dignity, even at the cost of forgoing important services. 73 Universal programs like Medicare, on the other hand, do not carry the problem of stigma. If everyone receives healthcare through the same program, poor individuals do not need to feel that participation in the program automatically identifies them as being poor. 74 For all of these reasons, programs targeted at the poor do not achieve universal coverage of the indigent. Among those eligible for food stamps, for example, only two-thirds sign up for the benefit.
75
The stinginess of Medicaid is reflected in ways other than its past failure to reach all of the poor. While eligibility for a federal welfare program has been necessary to qualify for Medicaid, it has not been sufficient. 76 Medicaid does not cover everyone who qualifies for a federal welfare program. 77 The income threshold at which one loses eligibility for Medicaid is lower than the income threshold at which one loses eligibility for cash assistance.
7 8 Thus, one can be viewed as so poor as to need payments from the government to make ends meet, but not so poor as to need government subsidies for healthcare coverage. 79 With its many limitations, Medicaid has reached less than half of those whose income falls below the poverty line; according to recent data, Medicaid covers forty-five percent of those with family incomes below the federal poverty level. 
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Besides being grudging in terms of how long it took to be enacted and in terms of how many of the poor would receive coverage, Medicaid was grudging even in the way it provided coverage to those who qualified for the program. While Medicare is fully funded with federal dollars, Medicaid relies on a combination of state and federal funding. Under Medicaid, the federal government offers matching dollars to states that provide their own funding. 81 Thus, state governments determine the amount of Medicaid spending in their states, and marked variations in Medicaid programs exist from state to state. 82 For example, the number of persons eligible for Medicaid differs from one state to another. One study found that Colorado's Medicaid program reached twenty-eight percent of the low-income uninsured, while the Massachusetts Medicaid program reached fifty-nine percent. 83 The shortcomings of Medicaid can be measured not only in terms of the number of people covered, but also in terms of the quality of coverage. For example, Medicaid pays physicians at lower levels than does Medicare, making it much more difficult for Medicaid recipients to find a doctor who will take care of them.
84
According to a national survey from 1998-2003, Medicaid's reimbursement rates for physicians averaged sixty-two percent of Medicare rates in 1998, rising to sixty-nine percent of Medicare rates by 2003. 85 Some states fall well below the average. In Maryland in 2001, Medicaid reimbursed physicians at thirty-six percent of the rate that Medicare reimbursed physicians. 86 Thus, while researchers in one study found that dermatologists would accept as new patients eighty-five percent of Medicare beneficiaries (and eighty-seven percent of persons with private insurance), they would take on only thirty-two percent of Medicaid recipients.
87
Critics also have observed that Medicaid tries to shoehorn poor persons into a healthcare model that is better tailored for wealthier persons. 88 Simply giving people an insurance card and relying on them to find a healthcare provider ignores issues of access for poor persons. They often live in areas underserved by physicians and hospitals, and they may not have automobiles or public transportation to get them to areas adequately served by the healthcare system. 89 In addition, lower-income 81 ENGEL, supra note 65, at 48. Medicaid's problems can be traced in large part to the lack of a strong constituency at its inception. Conservatives in Congress disliked the idea of the federal government assuming responsibility for a program that they believed was a local and state responsibility, and liberals in Congress recognized, for the reasons discussed above, that Medicaid was poorly designed to meet the healthcare needs of the poor. 91 Those who were involved in drafting the Medicaid legislation and other staunch proponents of healthcare reform believed that Medicaid would soon be supplanted by comprehensive reform and therefore did not dwell long on the program's shortcomings. 92 In recent years, Medicaid programs have fared even worse, as tight budgets force states to curtail their Medicaid spending. 93 Nationally, Medicaid consumes more than fifteen percent of state spending, and it has been the fastest-growing component of state budgets. 94 In the past, some states implemented cost-cutting measures that reduced the enrollment in their Medicaid programs. 95 More recently, as federal rules prohibited restrictions on eligibility, states have eliminated or restricted access to particular services, like dental or vision benefits.
96
To be sure, some states have tried to expand their Medicaid programs to cover more of the uninsured, and there are some important examples of reform. 97 But even these programs remain underfunded. 99 When Indiana passed its "Healthy Indiana Plan" to provide coverage to uninsured individuals, it did not create an entitlement to coverage for those who lacked insurance and were not covered under another government plan. Rather, it offered affordable coverage on a first-come, first-served basis to uninsured persons, with the number of available slots determined by the amount of funding raised by an increase in the cigarette tax. According to estimates at the time of passage, the new plan was expected to provide coverage for 130,000 people, about twenty percent of the number of uninsured persons in the state. 99 However, it only reached about a third of its projected enrollment before ACA was enacted, and Governor Mitch Daniels restricted enrollment-with the passage of ACA, the Indiana plan will be phased out by 2013."°' including residents of Detroit, the county seat. Many of the patients from Detroit lived more than ten miles from the hospital, and it was common for them to miss their follow-up appointments in the outpatient clinic because they had no good way to get to the hospital. But ACA does not address important problems with Medicaid. For example, it will remain a federal-state partnership, and that means that reimbursement rates and the availability of a physician willing to treat Medicaid patients will still vary from state to state.
1 0 8 And even at 133% of the federal poverty level, Medicaid leaves many families without coverage who cannot afford to purchase it on their own. 1 09 To be sure, ACA provides subsidies for low (and even some middle) income families who earn too much to qualify for Medicaid, but the subsidies may not be adequate to make private healthcare coverage affordable. Thus, projections indicate that millions of Americans will remain uninsured after ACA fully kicks in." 1 0 To this point, I have discussed the grudging nature of healthcare rights. They have been very slow coming, they have generally not reached all in need, and even those who qualify for coverage are unable to have their healthcare needs adequately met. There is another important problem with healthcare rights in the United States: they are formulated in a way that leaves them inherently unstable, The instability of healthcare rights can be traced to three important features of those rights. First, they are rights to payment for healthcare costs, but not rights to receive healthcare. Second, the poor must rely on the willingness of the wealthy to fund their healthcare costs, and the willingness of the wealthy to do so diminishes as the availability of a public program generates unanticipated demand for healthcare services and drives the costs of the program well above initial projections. Third, other than Medicare, healthcare programs entail federal-state partnerships rather than programs run solely by the federal government.
A Right to Coverage, Not to Care
As discussed earlier, healthcare rights generally recognize a right to payment for the costs of care, but not a right to receive healthcare. EMTALA ensures that patients receive healthcare to stabilize their emergency medical conditions, but under Medicare, Medicaid, and ACA, patients only gain access to insurance to cover their medical expenses.' They still must find a physician who is willing to accept payment from their plans. Medicaid patients have long found it difficult to find willing physicians, and Medicare patients are finding it increasingly difficult too."
12
As healthcare costs continue to rise and health plans contain costs by cutting their reimbursement rates, difficulties finding physicians will likely get worse." 3 In fact, ACA almost guarantees that Medicare will cut reimbursement rates. ACA created the Independent Payment Advisory Board ("Board"), which will develop proposals to keep Medicare spending within strict targets established by ACA."
4 The Board's proposals will automatically take effect unless Congress adopts substitute provisions."1 5 The proposals may not ration healthcare, raise costs to recipients, restrict benefits, or modify eligibility criteria."1 6 As a result, ACA leaves the Board with few options other than reductions in reimbursement rates. With reductions in reimbursement, physicians will be more inclined to shrink their Medicare practices and expand their care of privately insured patients.' 17 Many patients not only will find it harder to find a physician who will accept their coverage, they also will find it harder to afford care once they find a willing physician. While the Medicaid statute protects its recipients from high out-of-pocket costs, persons who will rely on the ACA subsidies for private healthcare insurance will have greater difficulty affording the out-of-pocket costs of their care. In recent years, employers and insurers have addressed the rising cost of healthcare by making 1 EMTALA, supra note 101. 
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patients responsible for a larger share of the costs. 18 Employers are requiring workers to bear higher payments for their insurance premiums, and they are offering healthcare plans with higher deductibles and co-payments."1 9 Patients face a double whammy. With the higher premium costs, which can total in the thousands of dollars a year, patients have less money to pay their deductible and co-payments. And the higher levels for deductibles and co-payments make it more costly to see a physician. With less money to pay greater fees, many patients are likely to delay or forgo needed care.
The Divergence of Interests Between Rich and Poor
Rights to healthcare in the United States are unstable for a second important reason. Under Medicaid and ACA (but not Medicare), the interests of the poor are divorced from the interests of the well-to-do. When Medicaid and ACA expanded healthcare access, they did so primarily for the poor or lower-income families.'
20
The financially secure generally receive healthcare coverage from their employers, or can afford to purchase it on their own. 21 Thus, those who are better off see
Medicaid and ACA as programs that serve the poor at the expense of themselves.
122
But with governmental programs like this in the United States, there generally is not sufficient political support to ensure adequate funding over time. 123 The poor have little influence in the halls of Congress or the statehouses, and the wealthy are inclined to disfavor programs that benefit only the poor. Thus, for example, programs like Social Security and Medicare that serve recipients at all income levels are far more successful than programs like Medicaid, which target the indigent.' 24 ACA preserves Medicare's broad base of support and improves Medicaid by imposing a federal standard for eligibility.' 25 ACA's expansion of access to healthcare coverage, however, depends on adding millions more of the poor to Medicaid, and providing subsidies for the purchase of insurance for those not poor enough for Medicaid but not wealthy enough to afford healthcare coverage on their own. Thus, the expansion in coverage depends to a substantial extent on the willingness of persons with political influence to fund programs for other people. Experience suggests that their willingness to do so over the long run will be limited. An important feature of ACA may compromise the willingness of the politically influential to support adequate funding for ACA's expansion of access. As mentioned, Medicaid under ACA will cover all of the poor, not just the poor that The inadequacy of public benefit programs serving the poor is a phenomenon not only with healthcare programs but also with other public benefit programs. The food stamps program is able to stave off malnutrition for the most part, but many poor families suffer from food "insecurity," ' 1 28 and the level of food stamp benefits is not sufficient to cover the costs of a healthy diet.
129 Fresh fruits and vegetables, for example, can easily overwhelm the grocery budget of a food stamp recipient.
130
Similarly, housing subsidies for the indigent have not been adequate to reach all those who need a home, and many Americans have to rely on families, friends, or homeless shelters for a place to reside.'
31
The problem with programs targeted only at the poor can be illustrated further by the decline in the federal housing program as it became more focused on serving the indigent. When public housing was developed in the 1930s during the Great Depression, 132 the federal government did not engage in means-testing, so tenants came from the solid working class, as well as the unemployed. 133 The housing was 126 See id. at 8 ("Under the new health reform law, nearly everyone under age 65-regardless of category-with income below a national 'floor' will be eligible for Medicaid .... "). 127 While the PWA housing was desirable, public housing that followed and that was reserved for the poor was especially unappealing. The PWA was a temporary agency, so housing advocates sought legislation that would authorize a permanent housing agency.' 35 In 1937, Congress passed the Wagner-Steagall bill over the objections of industry, particularly from the private housing sector that feared competition from the government. While they could not block the bill, industry and its allies succeeded in shaping the legislation in a way that severely limited its potential for success.' Far from launching a universal program for public housing, Wagner-Steagall targeted its benefits to those with very low incomes, on the theory that a public program should be reserved only for those whose needs could not be met by the private market. 37 The Act limited eligibility on the basis of income in two ways. First, the rent paid, plus utility costs, had to exceed twenty percent of household income. 138 Thus, families that earned more than five times their housing costs were not eligible for public housing. In addition, the federal housing agency was authorized to set absolute income caps, and they were set at levels below the poverty line. 139
With public housing now reserved for the indigent, Congress imposed constraints that eventually doomed the quality of public housing. For example, public housing projects had to be linked to the clearance of slums-the construction of new dwelling units had to be matched by the elimination of an equal amount of slum property.
14 The need to clear slum properties led to high land acquisition costs, leaving fewer resources for the construction of the public housing that would replace the condemned houses. 14 1
At the same time that higher land acquisition costs were imposed, Congress included spending caps in the legislation, further squeezing construction budgets.
142
There were limits on how much could be spent in construction costs for an apartment or even a single room, and public housing projects could not include "elaborate or expensive design or materials.' ' 143 In addition, public housing projects had to fall within strict cost limits. 144 These factors alone ensured austerity, but the U.S. Housing Authority went even further in containing costs, on the theory that keeping costs to a minimum would help generate public support and allow the government to maximize the number of housing units it could create.
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With all of this belt-tightening, public housing became a failed policy. New projects in New York City cost half as much per apartment as projects built in the city by the PWA, and they conjured up images of Soviet-style drabness and cheapness. 146 Out of this era came the much-discredited public housing high-rise developments that concentrated poor, mostly minority, residents in the new urban ghettos.
1 47 To minimize real estate acquisition costs, planners preferred high-rise apartments, which could maximize the number of housing units per acre of land.
48
But high-rise apartments made little sense for families with children.
49 Parents found it difficult to keep their eyes on children playing many stories below them, and gangs could readily find members among the large numbers of teenagers clustered together.
150 Notorious among these projects were the Robert Taylor Homes ("Homes") in Chicago, which comprised the largest public housing project in the world when completed in 1962.' The Homes housed 27,000 people in buildings that were claustrophobic and noisy. Moreover, they were located in a community that lacked green space, that was surrounded by littered streets and few stores or civic amenities, and that was plagued by gangs, drug dealing, and other crime.1 5 2
The Homes, whose residents were nearly all black and poor, also reinforced existing patterns of residential segregation. 53 Ultimately, high-rise public housing projects had to be torn down. 54 We can look not only to the federal government for evidence that public programs are difficult to sustain when they only serve the poor. The same has been true for state-run programs. The Oregon Health Care Plan provides a useful example. 55 In the 1990s, Oregon decided to expand its Medicaid program to reach all of its poor residents (i.e., those with a family income up to one hundred percent of the federal poverty level). i56 Instead of providing generous benefits for a limited number of the poor, Oregon would provide limited benefits for all of the poor.
5 At first, the program was well-funded, and the percentage of uninsured in the state dropped from seventeen percent to eleven percent. 58 As the Oregon economy stalled and government revenues dropped, however, Oregon raised eligibility thresholds, and within ten years of the plan's implementation Oregon's rate of uninsured had risen to pre-plan levels.
59
As the Oregon experience indicates, economic pressures make it very difficult to maintain public programs that primarily serve lower-income persons, and economic pressures are a particular concern in healthcare. Although President Barack Obama recognized the need for ACA to include cost-containment provisions, the bill falls far short of what is needed to bend the healthcare cost curve. 60 Indeed, once the law is fully implemented, it is expected to barely slow the rate of healthcare inflation, dropping it from 6.8% to 6.7%.161
The willingness of financially secure persons to sustain ACA's coverage provisions for the poor may be tested further because ACA maintains a dual healthcare system, with both public and private coverage, rather than switching to a system based primarily on public coverage. 62 In this dual U.S. healthcare system, the new public benefits may "crowd out" private coverage, making public coverage even more expensive for state and federal governments, and therefore less sustainable over time. That is, people who now have unsubsidized private healthcare coverage may switch to the expanded Medicaid program or qualify for subsidized private healthcare coverage.
Of particular concern is the possibility that ACA's subsidies for the purchase of insurance will encourage employers to drop their healthcare benefits. Currently, if an employer stops offering healthcare coverage, employees expect the employer to offset the loss of coverage by raising salaries. 163 That way, workers have funds to purchase their own healthcare plans.
164 But many employees may be able to purchase their replacement coverage with governmental subsidies through the healthcare insurance exchanges that will be created under ACA. In that case, the employer can effectively shift the costs of employee healthcare coverage onto the government.165 If this crowd out of employer-based coverage occurs to a significant extent, it will drive the costs of the subsidies much higher than expected and make it difficult to sustain ACA for the long term.
How likely is it that employers will drop healthcare coverage and send their employees to the exchanges? There are a few factors that will discourage employers from doing so. First, many of their employees may earn too much money to qualify for meaningful subsidies. 166 Hence, they would have to foot the bill themselves for policies purchased on the exchanges, and they would expect their employers to raise their salaries accordingly. Employers would end up paying more for healthcare benefits. Consider, for example, the costs to employers to provide $10,000 in healthcare coverage for an employee. If the employer provides the coverage, then it costs the employer $10,000. If, on the other hand, the employee has to purchase the coverage on a healthcare exchange, the employer will have to pay the employee For many employers, it clearly will be worthwhile to maintain healthcare insurance as an employee benefit. Hence, researchers have not projected a significant loss of coverage from employers dropping healthcare benefits. 1 68 Still, that might change as healthcare costs continue to rise, and especially so for employers with predominantly low-income workforces. Low-income employees will qualify for Medicaid or receive substantial subsidies to buy private healthcare insurance, so will not need an increase in salary to compensate for the loss of healthcare coverage from their employers.' 69 At the same time, the fines that will be levied under ACA's employer mandates are much smaller than the costs of providing healthcare coverage.
17 0 Even if cost pressures do not lead employers to drop healthcare coverage as an employee benefit, the cost pressures still will make it difficult to sustain the federal subsidies for Medicaid and for policies purchased on the healthcare exchanges by lower-income individuals.
In sum, ACA's right to healthcare will suffer from the fact that those who are financially secure must be willing to pay for the healthcare of the poor, and they must maintain that willingness even as healthcare costs rise further.
Federal-State Partnerships Make for Weaker Programs
The third major cause of instability in healthcare rights lies in the fact that they often entail partnerships between the federal and state governments. The Medicaid program provides a useful illustration.' 7 ' The federal government sets minimum standards and reimburses most of the costs, but the states determine eligibility and reimbursement levels for their own residents. 172 As a result, the percentage of uninsured varies widely from state to state, depending on a state's wealth and the willingness of its legislators to fund Medicaid coverage. In Texas, for example, twenty-five percent of the public is uninsured, while only five percent are uninsured in Massachusetts. 1 73 The deficiencies of federal-state partnerships are seen in other public benefit programs. When Congress created a permanent food stamp program in 1964 after some temporary programs, coverage was limited. 174 States could choose whether to participate in the program, they were allowed to set their own eligibility standards, and they could implement the program in some parts of the state but not other parts.
175 Hence, wide variations existed across and within states. In 1970, eligibility was limited in South Carolina to persons who earned no more than thirty-eight percent of the federal poverty level, while New Jersey extended its program to government established uniform eligibility standards for that program. 2°° ACA has done much to ensure uniformity by requiring Medicaid programs in every state to cover all persons earning no more than 133% of the federal poverty level.
2°'
ACA was supposed to promote more uniformity through a federal standard for the essential benefits that healthcare plans would have to provide. A right to healthcare is insufficient if it gives access to inadequate coverage, so ACA requires that health plans meet minimally decent standards of coverage.
2 0 2 With its decision to let states determine the essential benefits package, HHS has invited states to differ in the extent to which they ensure adequate coverage to their residents.
2 3 While ACA cabins the authority of states in defining essential benefits in important 204 ways, we once again must worry that residents of some states will end up with a limited right while residents of other states will end up with a sufficient right.
V. MAKING A RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE MORE STABLE
If ACA provides an unstable right to healthcare or if ACA is found to be unconstitutional, what alternatives would provide a stable right? Three possibilities come to mind:
1. The federal government could choose to employ or contract with hospitals, physicians, and other professionals to treat citizens who need medical care. Under this British model, the government would act not simply as an insurer but as a provider of healthcare. 20 5 The Veterans Affairs (VA) healthcare system takes this approach in the United States.
20 6 By implementing a fully federal program for all persons that provides care rather than just coverage, VA-healthcare-for-all would address all of the causes of instability in U.S. healthcare rights. However, even though the VA healthcare system has become a model for implementing reforms to
